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We study the evolution of cooperation within the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game on a square lattice where a
fraction of players µ can spread their strategy more easily than the rest due to a predetermined larger teaching
capability. In addition, players characterized with the larger teaching capability are allowed to temporarily link
with distant opponents of the same kind with probability p, thus introducing shortcut connections among the
distinguished. We show that these additional temporary connections are able to sustain cooperation throughout
the whole range of the temptation to defect. Remarkably, we observe that as the temptation to defect increases
the optimal µ decreases, and moreover, only minute values of p warrant the best promotion of cooperation. Our
study thus indicates that influential individuals must be few and sparsely connected in order for cooperation to
thrive in a defection prone environment.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 87.23.Ge, 89.75.Fb
I. INTRODUCTION
Sustenance of cooperation within groups of selfish individ-
uals is a challenge faced by scientists across fields of research
as different as sociology, economics and biology [1]. The
essence of the problem lies in the fact that cooperation im-
plies working for mutual interests or the common good of so-
ciety on the expense of individual prosperity. The additional
costs of cooperation can be avoided by choosing defection,
and accordingly, the cheating behavior of defectors spreads if
the evolutionary process is governed by the imitation of more
successful strategies. However, as the defectors become dom-
inant the whole society suffers because nobody remains that
would contribute to the overall welfare, hence the dilemma.
A commonly adopted framework for addressing the issue is
the evolutionary game theory [2, 3, 4, 5], and the prisoner’s
dilemma game in particular, which in its well-mixed version
reflects exactly the described plundering of defectors and the
consequent extinction of cooperators.
Although mechanisms such as kin selection, direct and in-
direct reciprocity or voluntary participation are largely suc-
cessful in preventing the defectors to reign [6], the seminal
observation promoting the survival of the cooperative trait ar-
guably came in the form of spatial games [7, 8], where the
participating players no longer abide to the principles of well-
mixed dynamics, but instead, cooperators are able to survive
via clustering that protects them mutually against the exploita-
tion by invading defectors (for a recent review, see [9]). An-
other important development that facilitated the understand-
ing of the evolution of cooperation came in the form of re-
placing the initially proposed regular interaction scheme with
more complex topologies [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18,
19, 20, 21], whereby in particular the scale-free network has
been identified as an excellent host for cooperative individuals
[22, 23], warranting the best protection against the defectors.
Since the strong heterogeneity of the degree distribution on
scale-free networks was identified as the main driving force
behind the flourishing cooperative state [24, 25, 26, 27, 28],
some alternative sources of inhomogeneity were already in-
vestigated as potential promoters of cooperation with notice-
able success. Recent examples of such approaches include
the introduction of preferential selection [29], asymmetry of
connections [30], different teaching capabilities [31], hetero-
geneous influences [32], or social diversity [33]. Arguably,
the differences between participating players, either in terms
of their degree, teaching capability or social rank, are easily
justified from the viewpoint of real life societies, as the latter
are in general soaked with members of different status having
unlike opportunities to become influential in the future. This
may be especially obvious by humans, but by no means diffi-
cult to observe in animal societies as well.
At present, our goal is to extend the scope of beneficial in-
fluences of heterogeneities on the evolution of cooperation by
considering a spatial prisoner’s dilemma game where players
differ not only in their teaching capabilities, but in addition,
the distinguished players posses the ability to temporarily con-
nect with distant individuals of the same rank and try to over-
take them. We show that this fairly simple additional exten-
sion may provide an unprecedented boost for cooperators that
can be compared only to the facilitative effect warranted by
the scale-free topology if using absolute payoffs. Indeed, for
an optimal fraction of distinguished teachers µ and probabil-
ity to temporarily link them during the evolutionary process
p, the defectors remain outnumbered throughout the whole
span of the temptation of defect b. Although intuitively one
might expect that larger b would require increasing numbers
of strongly connected leaders to sustain cooperation, we re-
veal that in fact the optimal µ decreases continuously as b in-
creases, and also, the interconnectedness of the distinguished
determined via p has to remain very weak in order for coop-
eration to thrive best. We study the mechanism underlying
the reported promotion of cooperation by calculating tempo-
ral courses of cooperator densities separately for the distin-
guished players and for their interacting nearest neighbors. In
addition, we discuss our findings in view of recent results ob-
tained on scale-free networks under assortative and disassorta-
tive mixing [34], and emphasize that special complex topolo-
gies may not be a necessary ingredient of a flourishing coop-
erative society.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
2the next section we describe the employed spatial prisoner’s
dilemma game and other details of the evolutionary process.
Section III is devoted to the presentation of results, whereas in
the last section we summarize and discuss their implications.
II. GAME DEFINITION AND SETUP
As noted, we use the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game
for the purpose of this study, which in accordance with the
parametrization suggested by Nowak and May [7] is charac-
terized by the temptation T = b, reward R = 1, and both
punishment P as well as the suckers payoff S equaling 0,
whereby 1 < b ≤ 2 ensures a proper payoff ranking. The
game is staged on a regular L × L square grid with near-
est neighbor interactions and periodic boundary conditions,
whereon initially each player on site x is designated either
as a cooperator (sx = C) or defector (D) with equal proba-
bility. Forward iteration is performed in accordance with the
Monte Carlo simulation procedure comprising the following
elementary steps. First, a randomly selected player x acquires
its payoff Px by playing the game with its four nearest neigh-
bors. Next, one randomly chosen neighbor, denoted by y, also
acquires its payoff Py by playing the game with its nearest
neighbors. Last, player x tries to enforce its strategy sx on
player y in accordance with the probability
W (sy → sx) = wx
1
1 + exp[(Py − Px)/K]
, (1)
where K denotes the amplitude of noise and wx characterizes
the teaching capability of player x. The parameter wx is as-
signed to each player at the beginning of the game and remains
fixed during the evolutionary process. In particular, among all
L2 players, and irrespective of their initial strategies, a frac-
tion µ is chosen randomly and designated as having wx = 1
whereas the remaining 1−µ are assigned wx = 0.01. Players
within the former group are the so-called distinguished play-
ers (or teachers) that are characterized with the larger teaching
capability, and according to Eq. (1), are much more likely to
reproduce than individuals pertaining to the less influential (or
blocked) group. Noteworthy, a similar setup has been consid-
ered in [31] where the parameter ν determined the fraction of
blocked players. Thus, a direct link to the present study can
be established by acknowledging that µ = 1 − ν. Moreover,
the phase diagram of the prisoner’s dilemma game on a square
lattice for a given ν presented in [31] reveals that the coopera-
tion facilitative effect of distinguished players becomes better
pronounced at high K . We will therefore use K = 2 through-
out this work, except in Fig. 4 where absorbing cooperative
states would prohibit useful comparisons of results obtained
at different b, in which case K = 0.4 will be used. Worthy
of notice is also that the two limiting cases µ = 0 and µ = 1
result in homogeneous teaching capability assigned to all in-
volved and are thus equal, only that in the former case the
evolutionary process is slower.
Further upgrading the model, we introduce the possibility
of direct information transfer between distinguished players
that are characterized by wx = 1. In particular, a teacher
from within the group of distinguished players may choose
with probability p, instead of a nearest neighbor with proba-
bility 1 − p, a distant randomly selected other teacher to be
the target for strategy transfer. It is important to note that
thereby only the strategy transfer is allowed between the two
distant teachers, yet both still collect their payoffs by playing
the prisoner’s dilemma game with their four nearest neigh-
bors, as described above. Thus, p is simply the probability of
temporarily interconnecting two distant distinguished players
during an elementary part of the Monte Carlo step, whereas
the remaining steps of the evolutionary process are left the
same. This directly implies that our findings are independent
of payoff normalization as the latter simply scales K but does
not introduce qualitatively different results. It is also worth
noting that permanent connections between members of the
group having wx = 1 result in similar behavior as will be
reported below, yet presently we wanted to avoid effects that
might be caused by differences in the degree of permanently
linked distant players.
Monte Carlo results presented below were obtained on pop-
ulations comprising 300 × 300 to 800 × 800 individuals,
whereby the fraction of cooperators ρC was determined within
2 ·105 to 2 ·106 full MC steps (MCS) after the transients were
discarded. It is worth noting that the above introduced dy-
namical rule can be interpreted as a Markov chain with two
absorbing states (C or D), where thus the observed mixed
states can be referred to as being stationary only for infinitely
large system sizes, whereas for finite systems it is more ap-
propriate to speak of quasi-stationary states or rather fixation
probabilities of the two strategies and average times needed
to reach the truly stationary absorbing states. Throughout the
next section parameters µ and p will be devoted the most at-
tention to as they are crucial in determining the density and
interconnectedness of distinguished players on the grid.
III. RESULTS
We start by comparing results obtained with the presently
introduced evolutionary model and its simplified versions to
stress the joint relevance of the two main parameters µ and
p. Figure 1 features ρC in dependence on b for four different
cases. The fastest decaying ρC is obtained via the classical
spatial prisoner’s dilemma game where all players are char-
acterized by wx = 1 (µ = 1) and temporary shortcut links
among distant players are disabled (p = 0). Slightly better re-
sults in terms of cooperation sustainability are obtained if the
latter condition is relaxed by setting p = 0.03, thus allowing
rare temporary deviation from the nearest neighbor structure
(here µ is still 1). Strikingly better results, on the other hand,
are obtained if instead of p the parameterµ is varied. Open cir-
cles show results obtained for p = 0 and µ = 0.12, whereby
the model with p = 0 has been studied extensively in [31] and
the interested reader may seek additional information on the
effects of different µ there. Clearly the best environment for
cooperators, however, is warranted when both µ and p are ad-
justed. Indeed, by setting µ = 0.12 and p = 0.03 we achieve
that ρC > 0.5 throughout the whole range of b, as depicted
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FIG. 1: Fraction of cooperators ρC in dependence on the temptation
to defect b obtained by setting: µ = 1 and p = 0 (open squares),
µ = 1 and p = 0.03 (closed squares), µ = 0.12 and p = 0 (open
circles), µ = 0.12 and p = 0.03 (closed circles). Only the joint
adjustment of µ and p warrants supreme promotion of cooperation.
Lines are just guides for the eye.
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FIG. 2: Contour line plot of ρC in dependence on p and b, obtained
for µ = 0.3. Lines mark ρC equalling 1, 0.8, 0.6, 0.4, 0.2, 0.1 and
0 from bottom to top. There exist an optimal value of p ≈ 0.05 that
promotes cooperation best.
by closed circles in Fig. 1. Thus, the joint impact of appropri-
ate µ and p strongly favors the sustainability of cooperation to
the extend comparable only to effects observed previously on
scale-free networks if using absolute payoffs [22].
In order to examine the impact of the newly introduced pa-
rameter p more precisely, we present in Fig. 2 a contour line
plot showing the dependence of ρC on p and b at a fixed value
of µ = 0.3. It can be inferred at glance that there exists an
optimal value of p warranting the best promotion of coop-
eration, which by the selected value of µ equals p ≈ 0.05.
Most importantly however, it is crucial to note the immense
improvement in ρC that is brought about by the addition of
rare temporary long-range connections among distinguished
players. In particular, while for p = 0 cooperators go extinct
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FIG. 3: Contour line plot of ρC in dependence on p and µ, obtained
for b = 1.1. Lines mark ρC equalling 1, 0.8, 0.6, 0.4, 0.2, 0.1 and
0 from left to right. Note the double resonance in cooperation that
peaks at small p and µ.
at b = 1.3, they prevail up to b = 2.0 in case p is fine-tuned.
In addition, the span of complete dominance is markedly en-
hanced as well. We argue that the role of distinguished players
in the small µ region is similar to the role of players occupying
the hubs of a scale-free network, whereby the temporary long-
range connections enable them to enforce cooperative behav-
ior not just to their permanently linked nearest neighbors but
to distant players as well, who then in turn spread the coop-
erative trait further to their nearest neighbors, and so on, thus
resulting in an optimal environment for the survival of coop-
erators even if temptations to defect are large.
Furthermore, it is instructive to examine how ρC varies in
dependence on p and µ. Figure 3 reveals that a double reso-
nance in cooperation, induced by variations of p and µ, char-
acterizes this dependence, thus suggesting that a fine tuning
of both parameters is necessary for designing the optimal en-
vironment for cooperative behavior. In order to examine the
resonant-like outlay of ρC in dependence on µ more precisely,
Fig. 4 features results obtained for different values of b and
a fixed value of p. Notably, the optimal µ decreases continu-
ously as b increases, yet its careful adjustment may still propel
cooperation away from extinction.
To understand the impact of different values of µ, we recall
the feedback mechanism resulting in widely enhanced coop-
eration within the model where players occupied a scale-free
network [22]. There hubs can dominate over their neighbor-
hoods because a larger degree directly results in a larger pay-
off. Hence the subordinate neighbors will imitate the hub’s
strategy, eventually producing homogeneous clouds of a given
strategy around each hub. During this process the nature of
the defecting (cooperating) strategy weakens (strengthens) the
governing hub, which in turn leads to an easy victory of a
cooperator hub when faced with a defector hub and thus to
the widespread dissemination of the cooperative trait. In the
present model a similar feedback mechanism is at work, but
only when the distinguished players are sparse enough not to
have their neighborhoods affected by other, potentially defect-
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FIG. 4: Fraction of cooperators ρC in dependence on µ obtained
by setting p = 0.4 and K = 0.4 (note that the lower value of K
was chosen solely to prohibit extensive absorbing cooperative states,
hence enabling more accurate comparisons). Results are depicted
for different temptations to defect: b = 1.1 (closed circles), b = 1.2
(open circles), b = 1.5 (closed squares) and b = 2 (open squares).
The optimal value of µ decreases continuously as b increases. Lines
are just guides for the eye.
ing, influential players; particularly when they are not directly
linked with one another and they don’t share mutual neigh-
bors. Therefore we argue that a primary estimate for this con-
dition to be fulfilled is µ < θs = 0.1869(1), whereby θs is
the jamming coverage of particles during a random sequential
adsorption [35, 36] when nearest- and next-nearest neighbor
interactions are excluded on a square lattice [37]. We find
that for our model the more accurate value of the jamming
coverage for the case when distinguished players don’t share
mutual neighbors is µc = 0.13965(5), thus validating the ini-
tial estimate via θs. In this low µ < µc region the previously
described feedback mechanism can work because the distin-
guished players can impose their strategies on the neighbors
without being disturbed. To illustrate this process we mon-
itored how the density of cooperators evolves within differ-
ent subgroups of the whole population. In particular, besides
the density of cooperators among all L2 players denoted by
ρC , we also measure the density of cooperators among all
the nearest neighbors of distinguished defectors (cooperators),
which we denote by ρC1 (ρC2), and the density of cooperators
among the distinguished players, which we denote by ρC3.
Obtained results are presented in Fig. 5 for three different val-
ues of µ, whereby µ = 0.25 is higher than the critical µc
value, µ = 0.1 is the optimal and µ = 0.07 the below-optimal
value at b = 2. A two-stage process can be inferred by fol-
lowing the time courses of the four calculated cooperator den-
sities, which gives insights into the mechanism underlying the
promotion of cooperation.
First, slightly prior to reaching the 100 MCS, defecting (co-
operating) distinguished players spread their strategy success-
fully among their neighbors, as evidenced by the local minima
in Fig. 5(a). As soon as the minimum in ρC1 is reached, the
second part of the two-stage process begins, which involves
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FIG. 5: Time evolution of ρC , ρC1 [lower three curves in panel (a)],
ρC2 [upper three curves in panel (a)] and ρC3 for µ = 0.07 (solid
line), µ = 0.1 (dash-dotted line) and µ = 0.25 (dashed line), ob-
tained by setting p = 0.03 and b = 2. See main text for definitions
of ρC1, ρC2 and ρC3.
turning the defecting distinguished players into distinguished
cooperators. In particular, as defectors occupy virtually the
whole neighborhood of a distinguished defector, the latter be-
comes extremely weak because there is no one left to exploit.
Thus, as soon as an influential cooperator receives the oppor-
tunity to overtake the weakened defector via a temporary long-
range connection the latter is defeated, and the newly seeded
cooperator starts spreading. Note that the described two-stage
process, including temporary minimum of ρC1, cannot be ob-
served at high values of µ exceeding µc. There the distin-
guished cooperators cannot be successful because their neigh-
bors may be exploited by other distinguished defectors. This
feature is demonstrated in Fig. 5(b), where the cooperator den-
sity amongst the distinguished ρC3 remains low if µ = 0.25,
but raises markedly for µ < µc. However, while very low
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FIG. 6: Fraction of cooperators ρC in dependence on p, obtained by
setting µ = 0.12 and b = 2. Remarkably, the optimal p is very small
(≃ 0.03). The line is just a guide for the eye.
values of µ (below the optimal) enable distinguished defec-
tors to convert virtually all their neighbors to defectors, and
thus make the negative feedback effect destined to work, at
the end only a few distinguished cooperators resulting from
the two-stage process cannot sustain an overall high level of
cooperation. Hence, an optimal µ exists which still initial-
izes the feedback mechanism, but subsequently warrants also
that the density of distinguished cooperators is high enough
to sustain the highest level of cooperation within the whole
population, as evidenced in Fig. 5(c).
We emphasize that the above described mechanism can
work even for large b, where substantial portions of non-
distinguished players are controlled by the spatial evolution-
ary rule strongly favoring defection. In this situation the coop-
erative behavior can nevertheless prevail due to small coopera-
tive colonies that can form around isolated distinguished play-
ers and then survive for very long times. Naturally, this mech-
anism of maintaining small cooperative islands is present also
at lower values of b, but there the defecting strategy is not
so beneficial among non-distinguished players, and hence the
relative contribution of such small colonies to the overall co-
operation level is moderate. This is why the impact on the
evolution of cooperation is most evident at high values of b.
To emphasize the necessity of a weak temporary intercon-
nectedness of distinguished players, Fig. 6 shows ρC in de-
pendence on p for µ = 0.12. The existence of an optimal
p can be observed clearly, and indeed, as little as p = 0.03
yields the maximum value of ρC . For lower values of p the
isolated influential cooperators can be eliminated by stochas-
tic events long before they are able to pass their strategy to
defecting distinguished players, while the increase of p drives
the system towards the mean-field type behavior favoring de-
fection over cooperation.
The latter observation can be corroborated by some con-
ceptually similar findings presented recently by Rong et al.
[34] who studied the role of different degree mixing patterns
on scale-free networks. There the assortative mixing, tending
to interconnect the hubs, was also found to diminish the level
of cooperation, whereas the disassortative mixing, promoting
the isolation of hubs, further enhanced the cooperative trait for
very large b but decreased the density of cooperators in noisy
environments for moderate temptations to defect. Presently,
we show that the special scale-free topology is not a neces-
sary ingredient for this type of cooperation facilitation, as in
our case the uncorrelated rare random links may also provide
the most favorable frequency of connections between distin-
guished players to optimally promote cooperative behavior.
IV. SUMMARY
In sum, we show that the additional introduction of tempo-
rary long-range connections among distinguished players in
a heterogeneous population comprising two different types of
individuals warrants a substantial promotion of cooperation
within the evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game on a regular
lattice. The joint effect of heterogeneity and temporary long-
range connections is capable to maintain cooperation within
the whole range of temptations to defect (1 < b ≤ 2) that
are usually considered for iterated prisoner’s dilemma games.
Noteworthy, our approach bears some similarity with game
theoretical models entailing the co-evolution of strategy and
network structure [38, 39, 40, 41], albeit presently the evolu-
tion of the interaction network in terms of temporary shortcuts
among the distinguished players is completely random. More-
over, we reveal that environments which are strongly prone
to defection require modest densities of influential players,
which in addition, must not be strongly interrelated with one
another. Importantly though, in the complete absence of inter-
connectedness these potential sources of cooperative behavior
are unable to enforce the strategy on more than just their im-
mediate neighbors, and hence a positive yet small value of
p provides just the missing virtue that enables the influen-
tial players to fully exploit their potentials. Our study thus
indicates that, while in a modestly corrupted society charac-
terized by small b influential players may be many and well
connected, this proves fatal in strongly defection prone envi-
ronments. The latter, on the other hand, require isolated and
weakly connected sources of cooperative behavior, which on
one hand give defectors enough space to completely weaken
their neighborhoods, and on the other, are frequent and in-
terconnected enough to overtake these sites after the negative
feedback has kicked in.
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